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As the concept of human security spreads in the pose-Cold 
War period it is often presumed chat non-democracies have 
worse human security than democracies. But the national 
human security (NHS) siruation in weak or failed democracies 
can be even worse than in some non-democracies. So how 
exactly do the NHS records of stares with different regime 
types like non-democratic China and democratic India com-
pare? To address this question the paper assesses and compares 
NH S in terms of "freedom from want" (anti-poverty security) 
and "freedom from fear" (anti-violence securiry). Ir develops 
a theory of how different regime types might impact NHS 
based on how regimes differ along the I ) democratic-author-
itarian and 2) predarory-developmental dimensions. It then 
conducts empirical testing of the theory through a global 
analysis of 178 countries and case studies of contemporary 
China and Jndia. The study finds that while democracies 
and developmental states generally have higher NHS than 
autocracies and predatory states, developmental authoritarian 
states like China on average have slightly higher human se-
curity than predatory democracies like India. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
0 ver the lase rwo decades che concept of "human security" has evolved into a major goal and objective of many concerned with international 
security (Paris 2001). Human security differs from traditional security 
approaches because it gives priority co che survival and well-being of individual 
people (UNDP 1994) rather chan che survival or well-being of scares and elites. 
le redirects preoccupation with the survival of scares in che international system 
towards enhancing the security of all people regardless of their age, gender, 
class, race, nationality, or ethnicity. Ir also recognizes chat threats co people's 
security may differ from threats to a state's security (Alkire 2003) and that 
efforts intended co enhance scare security may diminish human security (Enloe 
1990). 
The rich concept of human security has been promoted by NGOs, international 
organizations like the United Nations, and national governments including Canada, 
Norway, and Japan (Axworchy 2001). le has inspired both practitioners and 
scholars co reprende the practice and objective of promoting "security." Advocates 
of hwnan security have unveiled the fact that some of the traditional military-cen-
tered international security practices of the past and presenc have had litcle 
positive impact on improving hwnan security and have at times decreased human 
security by diverting financial and ocher resources away from fighting diseases 
and poverty cowards escalation of violence or unnecessary armaments (Dreze 
and Sen 2002; Alkire 2003). 
At the national level states sometimes decrease human security in their pursuit 
of national security. One example of this occurs when developing countries allocate 
their scarce resources to purchase large amounts of weapons from industrialized 
countries. While the weapons may bring some protection to the stare or the 
society, the same money could have been spent on securing food or immunizations 
that may have kept a much larger number of people alive, Further insult is 
added to injury when the army is able co use such armamencs ro extort, torture, 
and rape people in their local communities. 
An even more powerful example of diminished human security in the pursuit 
of national security can happen at the global level. This can happen when wealthy 
countries in the Global North spend incredible amounts of resources on measures 
that do not even increase their national security. Alternatively, instead of wasting 
such resources on measures that have no or little positive impact on improving 
national human security, they could be allocated to che fight against disease, 
corruption, poverty, and violence in the Global South which would dramatically 
improve global human security (Sachs 2005). 
Addressing these critical jssues this paper examines whether the dynamics 
of national human security are related to state regime-types. The paper has 
four parts. The first part critically reviews the literature on human security. 
Downloaded from Brill.com03/16/2021 06:19:10AM
via free access
DEVIN K. JOSHI 75 
The second part develops a theory of how developing-state regime-types may 
impact national human security (NHS). The chird part empirically tests che 
theory across a sample of 178 countries accompanied by case srudies of contemporary 
India and China, the world's most populated countries. The last part concludes 
with some reflections on che role of state regime-types in improving human 
security. 
11. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on hwnan security, a relatively new sub-field of security studies, 
has noc yet reached a consensus on what exactly constitutes "hwnan security." 
At this point chere are still competing definjtions of human security (HS) in 
the liceracure. Bue in spice of some differences ic is possible co identify a basic 
core chat mosc of these definitions hold together in common. Paris (2001) argues 
that HS differs from ocher conceptualizations of international security in two 
ways. Firscly it focuses on threats co individual people rather than threats co 
stares (UNDP 1994; Landman 2006; Glasius and Kaldor 2006; den Boer and 
de Wilde 2008). Secondly these threats can come from military and non-military 
sources that are both foreign and domestic (Chari and Gupta 2003). In this 
way HS differs from che focus on state-security which characterizes the "realist'' 
or realpolitik schools of IR. As the Hmnan Sec11rity Report 2005 purs it "secure 
states do not aucomacically mean secure peoples" (HSC 2005, viii) 
The U nfred Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been one of the 
international organizations at che forefront of promoting the importance of HS. 
It defines HS as having two main components; "Human security can be said 
co have rwo main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as 
hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden 
and hurtful disruptions in che patterns of daily life-whether in homes, in jobs 
or in communities." (UNDP 1994, 22) This definition was subsequently critiqued 
by a number of scholars for being coo broad and all-encompassing. In response 
Sabine Alkire from Oxford University's Center for Research on Inequahty, Human 
Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) developed a slightly narrower working definition 
based on safeguarding " the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive 
threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfiUmenc." (Alkire 
2003) This definition is also somewhat broad but Like che UNDP it emphasizes 
chreacs co individuals (rather than scares) and emphasizes that many if not most 
human insecurities come from economic, social, community, and ocher types 
of chreacs that are non-military. 
Although there are some differences in che HS definitions, the emergence 
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of the HS paradigm has led scholars and policy makers to broaden and deepen 
their perceptions of what constitutes a security threat (Paris 200 I). This has 
been critiqued by several scholars of " traditional security" studies who see human 
security as detracting attention from core military-centered and state-centered 
security concerns. On che ocher hand critical theorists like Shani (2007) have 
argued that increasing "securitizarion" as a result of the broadening perceptions 
of senuity threats may acrually result in all-pervasive police scares caking advantage 
of the opportunity to call just about anything a "security threat." This may 
result in scares using their mi.licaries or police powers to control activity in 
many domains of life and effectively remove those domains from the scope 
of healthy democratic deliberation and concescacion.1 
Acknowledging char there is no perfect or consensus definition of HS at this 
point, in this paper I follow the widely used and cited UNDP definition of 
HS as being free from hunger (food security), disease (health security) and repression 
(political security) as well as protection from unemployment (economic security), 
violence (personal security), and discrimination (communfry security). This con-
ceprualizarion of HS combines both I) freedom from fear and 2) freedom from 
wane, which also happen to be the two main goals chat guide the work of 
rhe United Nations (Annan 2000).2 
Recent scholarly literature has raised a number of theoretical perspectives co 
explain why human security may be better or worse within a nation. Leading 
hypotheses propose t hat human security improves with scare capacity (Rotberg 
2004), economic growrh (Sachs 2005 ), de.mocracizacioo (Landman 2006), economic 
interdependence (Russett and O'Neal 2001), UN peacekeeping operations (HSC 
2005 ), the avoidance of war (Leaning 2008), and che spread of global norms 
promoting different conceptions of "human security" (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Shani and Pasha 2007). On the ocher hand, ochers have emphasized the need 
for combining multiple measures together co achieve human security such as 
"the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bot-
tom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate 
use of force." (Barcelona Report 2003, 5) 
Unfortunately, the main shortcoming of human security studies is that they 
tend co focus more on defining and advocating human security rather than 
empirically comparing how, when, why, and co what extent various factors have 
or are expected to increase or decrease human security (e.g. UNDP 1994, Alkire 
2003, Khosla 2003, Glasius and Kaldor 2006). Another gap is that these studies 
tend to define human security either in terms of economic development or the 
absence of war and unfortunately these two dimensions of human security ace 
often treated separately. But is there a facror chat can explain protection against 
both poveccy and violence? 
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Ill. A 1HEORY OF HUMAN SECURl'IY AND STA'IE REGIME-1YPF.S 
In this paper I explore che role of a factor that is likely important for both 
dimensions of HS but has not played a central role in the human security 
literature thus far: state regime-type. While some scholars have already made 
the basic argument chat democracies fare better than autocracies on human 
security (i.e. Halperin et al 2004), my argument however is that there are not 
one but two dimensions of a state's regime type that are of critical importance 
for human security within a nation for its "national human security" (NHS). 
The first relevant dimension is whether che state is developmental or predatory. 
A "predatory scare" (Evans 1995) is a state that has low government effectiveness 
in providing public goods and services. Government effectiveness is low because 
che leader or leaders of the scare appropriate a fairly large portion of the state's 
resources for themselves and the benefit of their dose associates rather than 
strengthening state capacity and providing public goods to all or most of society. 
A salient sign that a state is predatory is its failure to provide basic services 
like universal education, one of rhe most essential public goods for economic 
and human development in a modern or modernizing state. Predatory states 
also tend to fail to collect che resources needed co implement public goods 
and services from the society it governs. For example these states generally 
fail to adequately develop their capacities for tax collection and military conscription. 
The "developmental state" (Johnson 1992, Woo-Cummings 2000) on the ocher 
hand has relatively higher government effectiveness and actively seeks to increase 
its national wealth. It is fairly successful in providing public goods like universal 
education, and it develops adequate state capacity to engage in tasks like sufficient 
cax revenue collection and universal military conscription. 
The second relevant dimension of state regime-type for human security is 
the difference between democracy and authoritarianism. Democratic stares have 
relatively more representative governments. They tend to represent the interests 
of a greater portion of che population than authoritarian scares because che 
population has more parcicipacion in the selection of leaders and policies (Landman 
2006). There is also more contestation between opposing ideas (Dahl 1971 ). 
A democratic scace generally distinguishes itself from ics non-democratic counter-
parts by regularly holding fair elections and allowing for competition between 
multiple independent political parties (Sartori l 97 6). When parties can peacefully 
alternate in taking control over the government, the state has consolidated a 
basic level of democracy (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1995). The author-
itarian scare (O'Donnell 1979) on rhe ocher hand is controlled by a single political 
parcy or small group of leaders. There are no elections between multiple political 
parries and few opportunities for mosr of rhe population co parcicipace in the 
selection of leaders and policies (Linz and Stepan 1995). 
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for national hwnan security (NHS). All other things being equal, I expect democratic 
and developmencal states to produce higher NHS than predatory and authoritarian 
states. However, as will be explained shortly, in the case of mixed states I 
argue that the developmental authoritarian state will likely have higher NHS 
than the predatory democracy. Thus the predicted rank hierarchy of regime-types 
on NHS is led by the developmencal democracy (#1), followed by developmental 
authoritarianism (#2), predatory democracy (#3), and predat0ry authoritarianism 
(#4) as shown in Table 1 below. These regime-types vary based on their mix 
of government representativeness (GR) and government effectiveness (GE). The 
predatory authoritarian state (#4) is low on both GR and GE while the predatory 
democracy (#3) is low on GE, but high on GR. The developmental authoritarian 
state (#2) is high on GE but low on GR, while the developmental democracy 
(# 1) is high on both GR and GE (Leftwich 1996).3 
TABLE I. 4 BASIC STATE-REGIME TYPES VARYING Al.ONG 2 D IMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE 
DevelopmencaJ Predatory 
Democratic ( # 1) Dcvclopmcncal Democracy (# 3) Predatory Democracy 
Authoritarian ( # 2) Dcvclopmencal Authoritarianism (#4) Predatory Authoritarianism 
Let me now explain why I believe this particular rank order of state regime-types 
should correspond to a roughly identical rank order of NHS outc:omes. The 
first issue of importance is to understand the main threats to NHS. The two 
main types of threats are poverty-related threats (PT) and violence-related threats 
(VT). At the botrom of the human security ladder, the predatory authoritarian 
state generally can not defend against either of these threats. As a non-devel-
opmental state it does not provide a means for the population co escape poverty 
nor does it have enough resources to prevail in the fight against internal violence 
or foreign threats. This kind of state will have the worse human securiry because 
it can prevent very little if any society-on-society or stare-on-society violence. 
This srace closely fits the descriptions of what Pee er Evans ( 1995) has called 
the "predatory scare" in Senegal, AtuJ Kohli's (2004) depiction of the "neo-patri-
monial state" in Nigeria and Joel Migdal's (1988) account of the "weak state" 
or weak post-colonial state in Sierra Leone. These states fail to achieve both 
human se<..urity and economic development because they are low on both effective-
ness and representativeness. 
The next best state on the NHS ladder is the shallow or predatory democracy. 
1 r often has more representation of society in the government, but the government 
is usually too weak (insufficient tax revenue collection, high levels of corruption, 
etc.) and unable co prevent much society-on-society violence. Fortunately, however 
it usually minimizes state-on-society violence. These states will typically deliver Downloaded from Brill.com03/16/2021 06:19:10AM
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club goods (Buchanan 1965) to the ethnic, class, gender, religious, or regional 
group(s) that concrol che state. Those groups will benefits from some public 
goods and services that can reduce human insecurity, but other groups wiU 
be stuck with high levels of human insecurity. This resembles what AtuJ Kohli 
(2004) labels the fragmented muJci-class scare in his depiction of India where 
urban, upper caste, upper class, and male groups have disproportionately benefitted 
from che scare while insecuri ties like poverty, disease, hunger, and violence are 
still widespread among the rural, lower class, and lower caste g roups. This type 
of scare is likely co prevail when dominant caste, class, and ethnic/racial groups 
use the state machinery co enrich themselves at the expense of ocher groups. 
At the next highest level on the NHS ladder is the developmental authoritarian 
scare. This scare is capable of and usually chooses co prevent much society-on-society 
violence. It often practices universal military conscription and cakes che im-
plemencacion of basic public goods like universal education seriously. lcs goal 
is co generate economic development out of che human and natural resources 
available. le usually educates the population co have basic skills making chem 
capable of working in factories, as technicians, as soldiers, and as police and 
security personnel co build the economy and defend the nation. In these scares 
national human security is enhanced through diminished poverty and disease 
compared co predatory states. On the other hand, civil and political rights are 
typically worse (more repression by the scare) chan in che predatory democracy 
because there are few checks against state-on-society violence. This type of state 
is typified by South Korea from 1960-1987, which other scholars have labeled 
as an example of a "developmental srate" (Johnson 1982) with "embedded aucono-
my" (Evans 1995) or as a "cohesive capitalist scare" by Kohli (2004). 4 
Compared ro all rhe state types we have discussed so far, the best states 
for national human security are developmental democracies. These are states 
with an effective and democratic government. The state has sufficient capacity 
to implement public goods and collect tax revenue collection. At the same time 
it is sufficiently transparent and accountable due to the alternation of political 
parties in power, fair elections, and institutions such as public hearings and 
press freedom. These scaces will scill have some degree of society-on-society 
and state-on-society violence but they are expected to have less violence than 
the ocher three types of scat es and a lower incidence of poverty. 5 
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTING 
I predict char my classification of regime types will be closely correlated with 
NHS levels. Firstly I expect that a high portion of the national popuJation 
in a predatory authoritarian state will suffer from major human insecurities like 
poverty, disease, repression, and violence. Secondly, I predict chat on average Downloaded from Brill.com03/16/2021 06:19:10AM
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the percent that will suffer from these basic insecurities in a predatory democracy 
will also be high but not as bad as under predatory authoritarianism. Thirdly, 
under developmental authoritarianism I expect a slightly smaller portion of the 
national population to suffer from these maladies compared to predatory democracy. 
Lastly, I predict that developmental democracies will have the smallest pore ion 
of its population suffering from these vital forms of human insecurity. 
The fuse way I test the theory is to look at the global distribution of countries 
based on regime-type co see if there is any correlation with human security. 
In order co operationalize my concepts I use several measures as shown in Table 
2 below. Firstly, I distinguish "developmental states" from "predatory states" 
based on the effectiveness of the government in implementing essential public 
goods. While it is challenging to compare public goods implementation across 
a large number of countries, a good proxy is to compare the extent to which 
d ifferent scares have succeeded in implementing universal basic education. To 
chis end I use che United Nations Development Program (UNDP) education 
index which measures literacy and school enrollment across nations. I code countries 
with a score from 0-79 on the education index as predatory and chose with 
a score from 80-100 as developmencaJ. This roughly means char scares which 
have extended basic schooling to over four fifths of the population can be considered 
as developmental while chose chat have not are classified as predatory. While 
this is not a perfect measure of che predatory-developmental dimension it does 
at lease caprure che state's effectiveness in implementing a public good chat 
is crucial for development in every modern society. 
TABLE 2. I NDICATORS Of RfGIM£ TYPE AND H UM.AN SECURJTY FOR 2005 
Concept Indicator Source 
A I) Developrnencal Scace Education Index Score becwccn 80-100 UNDP 2008 
A2) Predatory State Education Index Score between 0-79 UNDP 2008 
A3) Democratic Stare Preedom House Score berween 7-12 Freedom House 2006 
A4) Authoritarian State Freedom House Score becween 0-6 Freedom House 2006 
BI) Anti-Poverty Security 
Logged and Adjusted PPP Per Capita 
UNDP 2008 
Income (Scaled 0-100) 
B2) Ami-Violence Security Physical Integrity Index Score (Scaled 0-100) CIR! Database 2009 
B3) Human Security Index Average Score of Bl and 8 2 Author's Calculacions 
Secondly, I distinguish democracies from authoritarian states by combining 
national scores on Freedom House's civil liberties aod political rights indices. 
I code states with scores from O co 6 as authoritarian states and states with 
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scores from 7 to 12 as democratic states. This measure is also not a perfect 
indicator of government representative-ness but it is available on an annual 
basis for a large number of countries and does give at least a rough indication 
of the extent to which a country is democratic or authoritarian. 
lmrdly, co measure hwnan security f develop a simple National Human Security 
Index (NHSl) based on the average of rwo equally weighted component indicators. 
The first indicator is logged per capita income measured by purchasing power 
and scaled from 0 to 100 using the well-known UNDP (2008) scaling methodology 
which appears in the Human Development Report. The second indicator is the 
physical integrity index (PII) score scaled from 0 co l 00 as calculated by the 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRJ 2009) human rights database. The PII is a measure 
of how well the population is protected from torture, extrajudicial killings, dis-
appearances, and political imprisonment. These cwo indicators are used co calculate 
the NHSI because they capture the two main types of human insecurities. The 
first type ("freedom from want") is mainly poverty-related (disease, povercy, 
hunger) and the second cype ("freedom from fear") is primarily violence-related 
(repression, discrimination, and violence). Therefore we are able to develop a 
national human security index (NHS!) by combining an encompassing anti-poverty 
indkacor (purchasing power parity per capita income) with an encompassing 
anti-violence indicator (physical integrity index score). 
Table 3 below provides the 2005 scores for 178 countries on the NHSI, 
per capita income, physical integrity index, education index, and freedom house 
index all scaled from 0 (lowest) to LOO (highest). The five lowest scoring countries 
on the NHSI are Ethiopia, Nonh Korea, Bangladesh, Iraq, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Gmgo all with scores between 20 and 29 out of 100. By comparison 
the five highest scoring countries on cbe NHSI (Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands) had scores between 98 and 100 that were much 
higher than the average score of 65 . 
TABLE 3. 2005 H UMAN SECURJ'n' AND REGIME-TYPE INDICATOR SCORES BY COUNTRY 
National 





Integrity Capita Income Index House 
Score 
Index Score (PPP) Score Score 
Ethiopia 20 0 39 39 33 
North Korea 25 0 49 90 0 
Bangladesh 25 0 50 5.2 50 
Iraq 29 13 45 67 25 
Dem. Rep. Congo 29 25 33 50 17 
Nepal 29 13 46 54 25 
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National 




In dex (NHSI) 
Integrity Capita Income Index House 
Score 
Index Score (PPP) Score Score 
India 30 0 59 63 75 
Uzbekistan 32 13 51 87 0 
Sudan 32 13 51 49 0 
Ericrea 33 25 40 48 8 
Pakistan 33 13 53 45 25 
Nigeria 33 25 40 63 50 
Chad 35 25 44 32 25 
Uganda 35 25 45 65 42 
Burundi 35 38 32 49 50 
Togo 35 25 45 54 25 
China 35 0 70 80 8 
Tanzania 35 38 33 60 58 
Colombia 36 0 72 84 67 
Core d'Ivoire 36 25 47 44 17 
H aiti 36 25 47 54 8 
Indonesia 37 13 61 79 75 
Zimbabwe 38 25 50 71 8 
Myanmar 38 38 39 70 0 
Philippines 39 13 66 87 67 
Ccnrral African Rep. 40 38 42 39 42 
Kenya 40 38 42 67 67 
Afghanistan 40 50 30 35 33 
Iran 43 13 73 78 17 
Thailand 43 13 74 82 67 
Madagascar 44 50 37 65 67 
Yemen 44 50 37 55 33 
Laos 44 38 50 66 8 
Zambia 44 50 39 64 50 
Mauritania 45 38 52 48 33 
Angola 45 38 53 47 25 
Azerbaijan 45 25 65 83 25 
Rwanda 46 50 42 58 25 
Congo 46 50 42 68 33 
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National 
Physical Scaled Per Education Preedom 
Country 
Human Security 
Integrity Capita Income Index House 
Index (NHSI) 
Index Score (PPP) Score Score 
Score 
Malawi 47 63 32 64 50 
Venezuela 48 25 70 84 50 
Sierra Leone 49 63 35 40 58 
Equatorial Gui.nea 49 25 73 73 8 
Syria 49 38 61 73 0 
Turkey 49 25 74 78 67 
Egypt 50 38 63 74 25 
Morocco 51 38 64 55 42 
Ease Timor 51 63 39 61 67 
Cameroon 51 50 52 65 17 
Burkina 52 63 42 26 50 
Mozambiqe 52 63 42 46 58 
Cambodia 53 50 55 67 25 
Tajikistan 53 63 44 86 25 
Niger 55 75 34 26 67 
Guinea-B 55 75 35 41 58 
Senegal 55 63 48 51 75 
Turkmenistan 55 50 61 86 0 
Tunisia 56 38 74 75 25 
Ecuador 56 50 63 83 67 
Moldova 57 63 51 84 58 
Sri Lanka 57 50 64 77 67 
Djibouti 57 63 51 48 )3 
Libya 57 38 77 89 0 
Guinea 57 63 52 37 25 
Russia 58 38 78 94 25 
Mexico 58 38 78 84 83 
Papua New Guinea 58 63 54 49 67 
Lebanon 59 50 67 86 42 
Israel 59 25 93 93 92 
Cuba 59 50 68 94 0 
Vietnam 60 63 57 77 17 
Honduras 61 63 59 76 67 
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Nnional 





integrity Capita Income Index House 
Score 
Index Score (PPP) Score Score 
Nicaragua 61 63 60 74 67 
Kazakhstan 61 50 73 ')7 25 
Dominican Rep. 62 50 74 81 83 
Brazil 62 50 74 88 83 
Gambia 62 75 49 46 42 
Kyrgyz 62 75 49 89 42 
Jamaica 63 63 63 79 75 
Mongolia 63 75 5 I 88 83 
Guyana 63 63 64 92 67 
Mali 63 88 39 30 83 
Swaziland 64 63 65 70 17 
Armenia 64 63 65 85 42 
B<:nin 64 88 41 43 83 
Ghana 64 75 54 54 92 
South Africa 64 50 79 80 92 
El Salvador 64 63 66 76 75 
Maldives 64 63 66 81 25 
J ordan 65 63 67 85 42 
Bolivia 65 75 56 86 67 
Peru 65 63 68 87 75 
Sc. Vincenc 66 63 70 79 92 
Ukraine 67 63 71 93 75 
Gabon 67 63 71 78 33 
Lesotho 67 75 59 74 75 
Algeria 67 63 71 72 25 
Belize 67 63 71 78 92 
Georgia 67 75 59 88 67 
Macedonia 67 63 71 83 67 
Bhuran 67 75 59 50 25 
Belarus 68 63 73 94 8 
Guatemala 69 75 64 68 50 
Paraguay 70 75 64 81 67 
Malaysia 70 63 78 82 50 
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National 
Physical Scaled Per Education Freedom 
Coumry 
Human Securicy 
lncegrity Capita Income Index House 
Index (NHSI) 
lnde,c Score (PPP) Score Score 
Score 
Dominica 72 75 69 85 100 
Sc. Lucia 73 75 70 85 100 
Oman 73 63 84 74 25 
Saudi Arabia 73 63 84 79 8 
Namibia 74 75 72 75 83 
Panama 74 75 72 86 92 
Suriname 74 75 73 83 83 
Grenada 74 75 73 85 92 
Comoros 75 100 50 52 50 
USA 75 50 100 96 100 
Bulgaria 75 75 75 90 92 
Romania 75 75 75 87 83 
Solomon Islands 75 100 50 62 67 
Sao Tome 76 100 51 75 83 
Uruguay 76 75 77 93 100 
Bahrain 76 63 90 86 33 
Soucl1 Korea 76 63 90 98 92 
Albania 77 88 66 84 67 
Cape Verde 78 88 68 74 100 
Kuwait 78 63 93 84 42 
Fiji 78 88 68 85 58 
Argcnrina 79 75 83 93 83 
Vanuatu 79 I 00 58 69 83 
Trinidad 79 75 83 82 75 
Bosnia 79 88 71 83 58 
UK 80 63 97 96 100 
Costa Rica 82 88 77 84 100 
Greece 83 75 91 98 92 
Chile 84 88 80 89 100 
UAE 84 75 92 74 17 
Botswana 84 88 80 75 83 
Antigu3 84 88 81 81 83 
Mauritius 84 88 81 80 100 
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National 




l megrity Capita Income Index House 
Score 
Index Score (PPP) Score Score 
Croaria 84 88 81 86 83 
Samoa 84 100 69 86 83 
Latvia 85 88 82 95 LOO 
Poland 85 88 82 93 100 
Singapore 85 75 95 90 42 
Lithuania 85 88 83 96 100 
Estonia 86 88 84 96 100 
Canada 86 75 97 99 100 
Spain 86 75 97 99 100 
Tonga 87 100 74 90 50 
Barbados 87 88 86 94 100 
Hungary 87 88 87 94 100 
Baham35 87 88 87 83 100 
Portugal 88 88 89 92 100 
Czech 88 88 89 91 100 
Taiwan 89 88 90 96 100 
Slovenia 89 88 90 97 100 
Cyprus 89 88 91 87 100 
New Zealand 90 88 92 100 100 
Qarar 91 88 94 83 25 
Sc. Kim 91 100 82 85 100 
Italy 91 88 94 95 100 
France 91 88 95 98 100 
Japan 92 88 96 93 92 
Austral ia 92 88 96 100 100 
Finland 92 88 96 100 100 
Sweden 92 88 97 97 100 
Slovakia 92 100 85 89 100 
A~cria 92 88 97 95 100 
Seychelles 92 IOO 85 87 67 
Swiss 93 88 98 92 100 
lrdand 93 88 99 99 100 
Malca 94 100 88 84 100 
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National 
Physical Scaled Per Education Freedom 
Country 
Human Security 
Integrity Capita Income Index House 
Index (NHSI) 
Index Score (PPP) Score Score 
Score 
Brunei 97 100 94 85 25 
Germany 97 100 95 88 LOO 
Netherlands 98 100 96 99 100 
Belgium 98 LOO 96 97 l00 
Denmark 99 100 97 100 LOO 
Luxembourg 100 100 100 92 100 
Norway 100 100 LOO 100 LOO 
Our first empirical test is to compare regime-type performance on the 2005 
national human security index displayed above.6 The results are shown in Figure 
1. On the y-axis is che national human security index (NHSI) score and on 
the x-axis are the 4 regime types. Although there is a large amount of variation 
in scores for each regime-type a basic pattern emerges which supporcs the theoretical 
predictions ouclined in the previous section. The average human security scores 
for each regime-type fit the expected rank hierarchy and the regression line 
is positive and in the expected direction. On average developmental democracies 
(type 4) had the highest NHS score followed by developmental authoritarians 
(type 3), predatory democracies (type 2), and predatory authoritarians (type 
1) in char order. 
F1GUR£ I. RF.GJME-TYPE ANO NAT IONAL H UMAN SECURITY I NDEX (2005) 
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A summary of the data displayed in Figure l is outlined in more detaiJ in 
Table 4 below. The average NHSI score was highest for developmental democracies 
(79). They scored well on both anti-poverty secwity (82) and anti-violence security 
(77). Second highest scoring were the developmencaJ authoritarian scares (62), 
followed by predatory democracies (59) and predatory authoritarian states (47). 
The main divergence among che rwo mixed-regime types (#2 and #3) is chat 
deveJopmental authoritarian states have more violence (5 3) but less poverty (71 ). 
This means they are probably better for the human security of the poor and 
working class than for the human security of the rich and the middle class. 
Predatory democracies on che ocher hand have less violence (64) but more poverty 
(54). Presumably this would be better for the human security of the rich and 
the middle class chan for che poor and che working class.7 
TABLE 4. REGIME TYPE AND AVERAGE H UMAN SECURJ1Y INDEX SCORES (0-100). 
Regime Type (n = number of countries) National Human Anti-Povert)• Anti-Violence 
Security Index Score Score 
I) Developmental Democracy (n = 75) 79 82 77 
.2) Developmental Authoritarianism (n = 24) 62 7 1 53 
3) Predatory Democracy (n = 30) 59 54 64 
4) Predatory Authoritarianism (n = 49) 47 52 42 
Average Score (n = 178) 65 68 62 
Although our global comparison of countries has found a correlation in the 
expected direction ic is worthwhile co look now ac some case studies to gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of NHS dynamics. For chis purpose we 
look at rwo cases of mixed regime couocries (India and China) to see more 
closely how regime type may impact their national human security. India and 
China are aJso obvious initial cases co cesc in developing a global theory of 
national human security since chey have che world's largest populations. Thus, 
even if we are not able to generaJize beyond these cases, the study of these 
two countries alone can enlighten us about the human security conditions for 
aJmost two fifths of rhe world's popuJacion. 
Based on our indicators above for 2005 India feU into the category of a predatory 
democracy while China fies the characreriscics of a developmencal authoritarian 
state. If my theory of regime types and human security is accurate then we 
would expect to find India at a human insecurity level worse than China. As 
it turns out both countries scored low on the NHSI and India (30) scored 
lower than China (35). It is noteworthy that India which has remained democratic 
for much of the period from l 947-2005 (except for l 975- 1977) has a very 
disappointing NHS score, one chat is even lower than China. lo order co make 
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sense of chis seemingly paradoxical finding it is worth examining rhe human 
security situation more closely in these two countries to see why democratic 
India scores lower than China on the NHSI. 
To assess the human security levels of India and China in the 2000s I proceed 
by disaggregating human security for the three primary population groups: women, 
men, and children. I begin this analysis with a look at child hunger, poverty, 
illiteracy, and disease. Children make up a large portion of che population in 
most developing countries and from a people-centered perspective their security 
is just as important as the security of adults. Arguably in fact children's security 
may even be more important because rhey have potentially long lives ahead 
of themselves and will determine the security and development prospects of 
their nation's futures. 
• Children's Semrity: When it comes to children China appears co have consid-
erably higher HS than India as of 2005. As an indicator of disease prevalence 
{health insecurity), India's infant mortality rate of 5.6% is more than double 
that of China (2.3%) and the percent of children who die before reaching 
age five in India (7.4%) is close co triple rhe rate in China (2.7%) (WHO 
2008). Hunger (food insecurity) is also a serious problem in both countries 
bur appears much worse in India. According to recent national survey 
results for 2005-2006 child malnutrition levels in India are very high. 
Forty-six percent of Indian children are underweight and 38% are stunted 
(NFHS 2006). It is difficult to know exactly the level of child malnutrition 
in China because most health surveys in China do not evenly sample the 
entire population. Urban populations and wealthier areas are over-represented 
in mosr surveys while rural and migrant populations and poorer areas are 
usually under-represented. The highest estimate of child malnucritioa in 
China from a reputable population or health survey is 22%. It is possible 
that this is an underestimate but there are also estimates chat are much 
lower and some even less than ten percent (WHO 2008). Thus even if 
we assume the high-end child malnurricion estimate for China to be accurate, 
it would still be less than half the level of India. 
Disease prevention efforts and child health security measures also appear ro 
be more advanced in dlina. Basic immunization rates are 86% in China compared 
co 58% in India and the proportion of child births assisted by trained health 
professionals is estimated to be 97% in China bur only 4 3% in India (WHO 
2008). Ocher forms of child insecurity include low levels of education which 
prevent skill development and lead ro unemployment and underemployment 
(economic insecurity in adulthood). In India, child labor is estimated at 28% 
(Jayaraj and Subramanian 2005) and child labor laws are rarely enforced. Underage 
marriage is also common in India because marriage age laws are not enforced. 
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The debilitating practice of dowry which is so damaging co girls is also common 
in India because anti-dowry laws are not enforced. In China, child labor and 
dowry appear to be less common because there is more enforcement of child 
labor and anti-dowry laws. Underage marriage is also less common in China 
because there is more enforcement of underage marriage laws. Both countries 
are plagued with the problem of chiJd trafficking although the scale appears 
to be somewhat larger in India (DOS 2008). 
• Women's Security: The position of women in both Indian and Chinese society 
is inferior to the position of men. This is based in part on cultural norms 
favoring men and sons. As a result both countries have skewed sex ratios 
and a disproportionate ratio of males to females in the youth and adult 
populations. Sex-selective abortions of females run high in both countries. 
China has massive forced abortions and forced scerilizacions. Women in 
China cannot choose how many children to have and women are regularly 
subjected to invasive surgeries and medical treatments as a result of how 
China implements its one-child policy. 
In cerms of community violence, ic is difficult co measure the exact magnitude 
of violence against women. Rapes and domestic violence are present in both 
countries, although women in China appear co have more freedom co move 
about in public spaces. Recent survey evidence shows that two thirds of married 
Indian women are not allowed to leave their households co visit relatives or 
go to the market unless they are given permission by their husbands (NFHS 
2006). 
Several pieces of evidence suggest chat Chinese women are less likely to experience 
hunger, disease, and poverty chan their counterparts in India. One indicator 
is that 46% of women are married before age 20 in India compared to less 
than 5% in China. This allows Chinese women to have more time co pursue 
education and employment opportunities outside the house which can increase 
their earning capabilities and reduce economic insecurity. One measure that 
reflects the education divide between the two countries is that as of 2000 female 
illiteracy was 52% in India compared to 13% in China. The number of girls 
enrolled in secondary school is also the same as boys' enrollment in China but 
girls' enrollment is 12 percentage points less than boys' enrollment in India. 
Because female education is fairly low in India women there are more likely 
ro face economic insecurity and food insecurity. 
• Men's Semrity: Since the available national-level data does not usually dis-
tinguish men's insecurities from insecurities of the total population, my 
review of men's security will necessarily overlap with an examination of 
human security for rhe coral national populations of India and China. As 
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discussed earlier we can measure food insecurity through health surveys 
that record malnutrition levels. A related measure of economic insecurity 
is the population below a nominal poverty line or given income threshold. 
According to the World Bank's two doUars per day purchasing power 
parity (PPP) standard the percentage of the population in poverty is 80% 
in India and 35% in China (World Bank 2009). Based on China's 2000 
Census and India's 2001 Census data male illiteracy is 27% in India compared 
to only 5% in China.8 
Discrimination on the basis of religion and caste/ethnicity is present in China, 
but it appears to be higher in India. Based on human rights reports India 
appears ro have more extreme caste/ethnicity-based, religion-based, and gen-
der-based society-on-society violence. Public safety also appears to be a little 
bit worse in India than China based on crime statistics and the comfort levels 
of men and women being in public places at night time. However, China is 
much more repressive when it comes to scare-on-society violence. China has 
over seven times the prison population of India when you include China's "re-educa-
tion through labor" penal camps although this partially reflects insufficient in-
carceration and punishment of criminals in India. There is greater likelihood 
of arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, and tonure on trumped up charges in China 
and a low likelihood of having a fair trial. However, torture in prisons and 
extra-judicial killings are not uncommon in India either as are long multi-year 
pre-trial detentions and long delays (often decades) before legal cases are tried 
and resolved. But the prison capacity of India is much less than China and 
the scope and scale of state repression and degree of arbitrariness are less in 
India. Unlike in India, regime dissidents in Cuna face a very high level of insecurity. 
A recent Chinese human development report identified four groups of people 
as being particularly low in security and high in vulnerability. These groups 
were the urban poor, rural poor, rural migrants in cities, and expropriated farmers. 
(Li and Bai 2005) India appears to have even more low security groups: scheduled 
castes ( .. untouchables"), scheduled tribes (indigenous peoples), backwards castes, 
the urban poor, the rural poor, rural migrants in cities, and minority religious 
groups. India's low security groups appear ro make up close to three fourths 
of India's population, whereas they seem to make up less than one half of 
China's population. It is however possible that some ethnic minority groups 
in China such as Tibetans also have low security equal co the indigenous peoples 
of India. The rate of poverty in China may also be much higher than rhe 
official average. There is always a certain degree of uncertainty when it comes 
co such indicators as stacisrical estimates are often questioned in both countries 
and the Chinese government is fond of secrecy when it comes to sharing accurate 
information about the condition of the country. 
When we ch.ink about personal insecurity (violence) and community insecurity 
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(repression) against men and ocher groups in sociery we can divide chis into 
two basic categories: l) society-on-society violence and 2) state-on-society violence. 
India is higher on the former while China is higher on the latter. In India 
there are many prisoners awaiting trials and much everyday caste-based violence. 
Many human rights violations in India are committed by society in the way 
they treat women, lower castes, people of ocher religions, and indigenous peoples. 
The Chinese state on the other hand commies terrible human rights violations 
including frequently punishing dissidents, imprisoning without trial, beating pris-
oners, and denying religious freedom. On measures of environmental security, 
both countries face problems of degradation and pollut ion, but environmental 
damage, ecological vulnerability, and pollution levels appear co be worse in 
China than in India. On the ocher hand there is notably less peace in India. 
Mose of India's border provinces have been in protracted states of war or conflict 
wich indigenous peoples, neighboring countries, or armed insurgents. There are 
tensions but currencly no wars or armed confliccs along any of China's borders. 
When you look ac employment securiry, according to World Bank figu res 
unemployment races were 4.2% in China and 5.0% in India in 2004. But 
escimaces by scholars typically run much higher. Giles, Park and Zhang (2005) 
estimate Chinese urban unemployment at 7 .3 percent and unemployment of 
permanent urban residents in Ouna ac over 11 percent. As is well known Chinese 
unemployment rates a re typically underestimated because che official figures 
only count registered unemployed workers bur do noc count che many millions 
of laid-off (xiagang) workers who have been "removed from their pose" from 
state-owned enterprises and are also unemployed. Indian unemployment estLmates 
in rhe decade of che 2000s also typically fall into che 7 co 10 percent range 
so there may not be much of a difference between the two countries on 
unemployment. Perhaps a bercer proxy of employment security is the percentage 
of workers working in the formal sector as opposed to che informal sector. 
As of 2007, an estimated 93% of India's labor force is che informal sector 
(DOS 2008), a level much hjgher chan in China. 
• Aggregate H1111UJ11 Security: We have just reviewed some of che basic human 
security conditions in India and China. This review is merely a rough sketch 
and is not intended co be complete, exhaustive, or all-encompassing. There 
are numerous other dimensions of human insecurities in both of these countries 
chat we have not had space co disc.uss here. Bue we have hoped to uncover 
and compare some of che most basic forms of human insecurity (hunger, 
disease, poverty, violence, repression, ecc.) in chese countries co see if they 
march rhe human security conditions we would expect co see given these 
nations' scare-regime types. 
Ac the risk of over-simplifying a very complex situation we have presented 
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several NHS indicators in Table 5 below for macro-comparative analysis of national 
human security in India, China, and elsewhere. Here we compare two indicacors 
of children's security, two indicators of women's security, and six indicators of 
overall human security based on the six dimensions of human security outlined 
by the United Nations (1994). China has a better record than India on eight 
out of the ten indicators including half the poverty rate and half the rate of 
child malnutrition. However, while China scores better than India on anti-poverty 
measures it also has higher levels of incarceration and riots than India. The 
implications for human security are decidedly mixed. China has more economic 
development than India but it is not democratic. India on the other hand enjoys 
a democratic government, but one chat has thus far been unable or unwilling 
to eliminate the scourges of caste discrimination, communal riots, and widespread 
disease, hunger, and poverty. 
TABLE 5. HUMAN SECURJlY INDICATORS IN CHINA AND INDIA 
Human (lo)Security Indicator China India 
I a) Hungc:r-Population below $2/day 35% 80% 
I b) Hunger-Child Malnutrition 22% 46% 
2) Disease-Child Morcality 27% 7.4% 
3a) Discrimination-Female lllireracy 13% 52% 
3b) Discrimination-Underage Marriage <5% 46% 
4a) Unemployment 7.3%? 7.2% 
5a) Violence-Murder (per million) 23.1 29.6 
5b) Violence-Rape (per million) 16.9 17.6 
6) Mass Incidents (China), Riors (India) 87.0k 56.6k 
6b) Repression-Incarcerated Population 2, l00k? 325k 
NCYfES: Poverty from Wodd Bank's World Dc.-vclopmmt lndicato~ 2008; Malnutrition from 3"1 National 
Family 1-!ealth Survey (NFHS) 2005-2006 (India) and World Health Organization (China); 
lllireracy from Census of India (2001) and 5d• Popu.lation Census of China (2000); Underage 
Marriage from 3'd NFHS (India) and Auchor's Estimate (China); Murder ancl Rape darn for 
India from National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) (2006) and Chinese Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) (2005) based on doubling the figures recorded for the first half of che year. 
Chinese Mass Incident data for 2005 from MPS and lndian riot data for 2006 from NCRB. 
Per capita statistics based on population estimatcs of 1.3 billion for China and 1.1 billion 
for India. India unemploymcnc rare cstimace from QA Factbook (2007). Chinese unemploymcnc 
race escimate from Giles. Park and Zhang (2005). lncarccracion rat,-s from the US Scace 
Departmenc Human Rights Councry Rcporcs for China and India (2007). 
V. CONCLUSION 
In our empirical analysis developmental democracies had by far the best record 
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of the four regime types on national human security, while predatory authoritarian 
staces had by far the worst record. In the middle positions developmental author-
itarians and predatory democracies had similar scores on average although devel-
opmencal auchoricarians scored slighcly beccer. In parcicular developmencal auchor-
icarians had lower poverty scores although predatory democracies had lower 
violence scores. 
In a more derailed analysis of cwo incermediate cases, China appears to score 
better than India on five out of six human security dimensions shown in Table 
5 above. This suggests the pervasive human insecurity level covering China's 
population is lower than ic is for India. These are of course aggregate measures 
char do noc consider che human security populations of different regions or 
echoic groups within these countries. Nevertheless, the NHSI findings for India 
and China supported my general cheorecical expectations of how regime types 
are likely co impact aggregace national human security. It was predicted that 
developmental authoritarian scares would on average have higher national human 
security than predatory democracies and in our case studies we found support 
co suggest chat China indeed has higher national human security than India. 
As we further disaggregated our national human security findings, China came 
out ahead on women and children, while India and China were about equal 
on men. A major reason for India's comparatively lower level of human security 
seems co be poverty-related with much of the insecurity coming from hunger, 
disease and poverty as well as caste-based and gender-based discrimination. These 
are problems chat can diminish significantly with improvements in economic 
developmenr and social equality. 
In summary, this study reveals that democracies do not necessarily perform 
better on human security than authoritarian states. However, while developmental 
authoritarian states may on average have slightly higher national human security 
than predatory democracies, developmencal democracies dearly have much higher 
human security than developmental authoritarian states. Thus it seems that 
the ultimate goal of all states seeking to improve their NHS should be co 
eventually transition co and sustain developmental democracies. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The human s<.'Curicy concept has also been criciqued on other grounds. Richmond and Franks (2005, 
34) point out that "mosc of che resistance co human security stems from the face char ic underlines 
chc negative consequences of all forms of violence, both just or unjust, and also places che 'haves' 
with responsibilities cowards che ' have-nots.'" 
1 Althoughthis definition serves as a useful starting point for my analysis I acknowledge that ic is 
not com piece or perfect. Several scholars have argued that psychological factors also play a key role 
in human security (i.e. Nef 1999; Thomas 2000; Reed and Tehranian 1999). I would largely concur 
with cheir assessment chat HS is not only made up of exceroal, observable threats to individuals, 
bur also internal perceptions of threats. However, because it is difficult in practice co measure internal 
threat perceptions ac the aggregate level J limit my analysis in chis paper co external obscrvabk-s. 
l I would like co point out cha1 the basic Weberian ideal-type state regime-rypcs depicted in Table 
I are neither exhaustive nor a complete list of all possible regime-types. Every state is located ac 
a different point on chc democracy-authoritarianism continuum and che developmental-predatory 
continuum. A broader depiction would be to distinguish scares into perhaps four places on che devel-
opmental-predatory scale such as: heavily predatory, lightly predatory, lightly developmental, and 
heavily developmental. These distinctions could be separated even funher into seven or ten or even 
hundreds of categories and sub-categories. It is only for the sake of clarity andsimplicicy thac I have 
laid our chc theory and rypology in dichotomous rerms such as predatory and developmental and 
democratic and auchorirarian. Jr is hoped chat the reader will understand why ic is practical ro lay 
out che theory in a simplified form that obviously cannot capture all of che infouce complexity of 
political reality. . 
~ Developmental authoritarian srates arc seem co be mosr common in Asia with che Ease Asian scaces 
typically having a more advanced form chan what exists in Central and West Asia. The primary 
difference is char Easr Asian states have tended co ope for a more advanced "human developmental 
authoritarianism" whereas the West Asian states have generally relied on a less advanced ~resource 
developmental aurhoritarianism" wirh Central Asian scares falling somewhere in berween. The more 
advanced developmental scares realize char rhey need co limir srace-on-sociery violence in order ro 
sustain ecooorruc development so they rend ro limit srate-on-sociery violence co harassing and punishing 
regime opponents. lo terms of political economy the advanced authoritarian developmental scares 
also tend co have an export-led economy. 
' South Korea and Chile since the 19'-)0s arc examples of developmental dcmucrac.ics. Neither of these 
statesmay be excepcionalJy high in GR or GE but both are :u a sufficiently medium or medium-high 
level. Many currently dcvelopmcmal democratic states were developmental authoritarian stlltes for 
much of rhe twentieth cenmry. This includes states in Ease Europe, many scares in che Caribbean, 
most states of Norcheasc Asia. and several scares in South Europe. Mose of West Europe transitioned 
from developmental authoritarianism co developmental democracies in the lace nineteenth or early 
rwenciech century. A few states however were predatory democracies prior co becoming developmental 
democracies. The states of North America and several states in West Europe fie into this category. 
le is worth pointing out char within che sec of developmental democracies chere is a particular subsc1 
which has a "deep democracy" or ~social democ[acy" which scores the highesr on human sccuriry. 
These sraces arc most concentrated in Northern Europe (Scandinavia). 
6 The curoff points here berween democracy and auchorirarianism and becwcen developmencal and 
predatory are admittedly somewhat arbitrary. For example, many would see chc UAE as dcvelopmencal 
and authoritarian but view North Korea as predatory and auchoricarian. Neverchelcss, these cutoff 
poincs roughly capture the basic differences between che 4 regime-rypes. 
7 This may in part explain why some developing country intellectuals and middle class members prefer 
a predatory democracy co developmental authoritarianism. 
8 My personal observations in China suggest chat China's male iJliccracy rate is somewhat higher than 
the official figure however it is not clear whether ic is acrually as high as in India. 
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